Gorleben Castor Resistance in Germany 2011/indymedia article translation
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Castor 2011? Saw, Remove Ballast, Scoop...!
Probably between 25 and 28 November 2011 another Castor transport with nuclear waste will be shipped from La Hague, France to the Lower Saxonian intermediate storage Gorleben, Germany. With a preliminary end of the nuclear power plant lifetime extension and the shutdown of some NPPs, the German Federal Government, by their standards, did quite a lot to pacify the German anti-nuclear movement that regained strength after the nuclear disaster in Fukushima. Germany is facing a energy turnaround say the news and the advertisements for the energy suppliers. This article explains the political backgrounds of the resistance in the Wendland region that doesn't calm down since decades, neither today. In addition, there will be and overview about possible forms of activism and necessary information about legal protection.
Political Backgrounds of the Anti-Castor Protests
When the Castor transport is shipped to Gorleben, different kinds of people will stand up against it. Over the last decades, nuclear transports to the Wendland region have turned into the biggest focal point of the anti-nuclear movement worldwide. They are the place where nuclear policy is most easily targetable, particularly because of the deep entrenchment of the protest movement in the Wendland region. Nearly the whole population, young and old, supports the movement. The lack of dogmatism is a very strong point of the resistance. It is also a good opportunity to draw attention to parts of anti-nulear politics that are not directly connected to Gorleben and are harder to attack than the Castor transport.
Uranium Mining, NPPS and "Reprocessing"
Final Disposal Issues / Gorleben as a Nuclear Disposal Site
Worldwide, there is no final disposal site for high-level radioactive waste. Likewise, this is hardly possible. Plutonium has a half life of 24,000 years. That means that it would need to be isolated securely from the environment for millions of years. A period of time that is hardly imaginable. No language, no symbol has existed even nearly for this time. To warn generations in 48,000 years, when 25% of the plutonium is still sending out radioactive rays, is very difficult. Not to speak of that for such a period of time, wherever you bury it, it is barely possible to ensure that nothing of the waste is released. In the repository ASSE, only a few years where enough for ground water to make its way to the radioactive waste, something that was considered to be unthinkable before. With this background, to produce nuclear waste is irresponsible to all following generations. Gorleben is a good symbol for the problem that there is no secure final repository worldwide. The salt dome in Gorleben was not chosen because it is the best suitable place in Germany for instance, but because of "geopolitical reasons", as they say. In plain language: Gorleben was located near the border to the GDR. In addition to that, the area is sparsely populated and it was not expected that the rather conservative farmers could stand up. Now the farmers have been standing up and the GDR does not exist anymore – Gorleben however is still intended to be "explored" just because it was begun with. And in order to create facts, the salt dome is extended within the framework of "exploration" to virtually become a final repository, even though there is no permission for this. More facts are created with every Castor transport to the interim repository. Along the lines of "but the waste has to go somewhere!" the stored Castors shall be buried in the salt dome at some point in the future – despite every concern. But nuclear waste shouldn't be put "somewhere", it has to be isolated from the environment as securely as possible. Since the "exploration" of the salt dome is in progress, an official suitability assessment is under way, but no results have been presented yet. Many independent assessments however came to the conclusion that Gorleben is no way suitable as a secure final repository, that a natural gas deposit could lead to problems and that the salt stock could flood if Gorleben is built as improperly as ASSE. All this doesn't build confidence in the long term storage project Gorleben.
A text about the final repository problem: endlager.pdf German
radiation limit at interim storage Gorleben nearly reached
At the interim repository the Castor containers are the only protection from radiation. And it is known that the containers let through a part of the radiation. At the moment, press reports that the radioactive contamination around this "potato barn" has significantly increased, supposedly because of the last hot transport. The measured values are close to the annual limit values for "persons exposed to radiation" (NPP workers, ...). It is probable that the radioactive exposure will exceed the limit value after the next Castor transport. The closeby residents will have to endure a radioactive exposure higher than the workers of a nuclear power plant. A logical conclusion would be to stop the next Castor transport. But because of national interests the responsible authorities don't want to know about this. The citizens' initiatives are taking the issue to court but one can assume that, despite the evident facts, the courts will act along the reason of state and accept the violation of radiation safety limits.
see also: Contratom: Meß- und Rechentricks für den Castor German
This translation is based upon the article Castor 2011? Sägen, Schottern, Schaufeln...! by "(((A)))" which was released under a creative commons licence on Indymedia Germany. Some small changes have been made to make it more understandable for international readers.